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Secrecy Performance Analysis of Location-Based
Beamforming in Rician Wiretap Channels
Shihao Yan and Robert Malaney
Abstract—We propose a new optimal Location-Based Beam-
forming (LBB) scheme for the wiretap channel, where both the
main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are subject to
Rician fading. In our LBB scheme the two key inputs are the
location of the legitimate receiver and the location of the potential
eavesdropper. Notably, our scheme does not require as direct
inputs any channel state information of the main channel or the
eavesdropper’s channel, making it easy to deploy in a host of
application settings in which the location inputs are known. Our
beamforming solution assumes a multiple-antenna transmitter,
a multiple-antenna eavesdropper, and a single-antenna receiver,
and its aim is to maximize the physical layer security of the
channel. To obtain our solution we first derive the secrecy outage
probability of the LBB scheme in a closed-form expression that
is valid for arbitrary values of the Rician K-factors of the main
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. Using this expression
we then determine the location-based beamformer solution that
minimizes the secrecy outage probability. To assess the usefulness
of our new scheme, and to quantify the value of the location
information to the beamformer, we compare our scheme to other
schemes, some of which do not utilize any location information.
Our new beamformer solution provides optimal physical layer
security for a wide range of location-based applications.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Rician fading, location-
based beamforming, secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security guarantees secrecy regardless of an
eavesdropper’s computational capability and does not require
complex key distribution and management [1]. In early studies
[2, 3], a wiretap channel model was proposed as the funda-
mental system model to examine such physical layer security
in single-input single-output systems. In the wiretap channel,
an eavesdropper (Eve) overhears the wireless communication
between a transmitter (Alice) and an intended receiver (Bob).
More recently, motivated by multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) techniques, physical layer security in MIMO wiretap
channels has garnered much interest (e.g., [4–9]). However,
many of the works in MIMO-based physical layer security
assume the (instantaneous) CSI of the main channel (the
channel between Alice and Bob) is perfectly known by Alice
or Bob (e.g., [4–6]). This assumption is usually very difficult to
justify in practice (e.g., in massive MIMO techniques the CSI
of a channel cannot be perfectly known even to a receiver due
to pilot contamination issues [10–13]). Another assumption
adopted in the literature is that the CSI of the eavesdropper’s
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channel (the channel between Alice and Eve) is known to
Alice, which is even harder to justify in practice.
However, there are many circumstances where location
information of Bob and Eve could be available. For example,
in some specific military application scenarios, Alice may ob-
tain Bob’s location through direct communications, and Eve’s
location through some (possibly a priori) surveillance. Other
circumstances could be where Bob and Eve are known users
of the system (but still requiring secret communications on an
individual basis), and their location information is routinely
broadcasted as per the requirements of the network protocol.
Examples of such circumstances would be in IEEE 1609.2 for
vehicular networks, or in some location-based social-media
applications.
Regardless of the application scenario, the main point
we focus on here is that if there is a line-of-sight (LOS)
component in the main channel or the eavesdropper’s channel,
it is possible to utilize location information directly in order
to enhance the physical layer security. More specifically, we
propose and analyze a new Location-Based Beamforming
(LBB) scheme in the wiretap channel, where both the main
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are subject to Rician
fading. Our scheme does not require the CSI of either the main
channel or the eavesdropper’s channel - thus making it quite
general, as well as pragmatic. The basic modus operandi of
the scheme we propose is that given the input locations of
Bob and Eve, we output the optimal beamformer solution and
the security level (the secrecy outage probability) associated
with this solution.1 Detailing how these outputs are determined
forms the core of our work.
Surprisingly, there has been little previous work in this
area, with the closest works perhaps those of [14] and [15].
In [14], the ergodic secrecy rate was examined for multiple-
antenna wiretap channels with Rician fading. However, in
[14] it was assumed that the CSI of the main channel was
perfectly known by Alice. The work of [15] analyzed the
secrecy performance of orthogonal space-time block codes
when the main channel is assumed to be subject to Rician
fading. But the eavesdropper’s channel was assumed to be
subject to Rayleigh fading in [15] and therefore Eve’s location
information was not that useful.
The direction of this paper and our contributions are sum-
marized as follows. (i) We first derive the secrecy outage
probability of the LBB scheme in a closed-form expression,
1Although our scheme works for any input locations. It is possible that the
secrecy outage probability approaches one (e.g., as Bob moves further from
Alice whilst Eve moves closer). We leave it to the system operator to decide
whether the secrecy outage predicted justifies the sending of data.
2which is valid for arbitrary values of the Rician K-factors
of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. (ii) We
then determine the optimal location-based beamformer and the
minimum secrecy outage probability for the scheme. (iii) In
order to fully appreciate the gains of the LBB scheme, we
also analyze, for comparison, the secrecy performance of a
Non-Beamforming (NB) scheme. (iv) As a final comparison,
we also consider the effect on the LBB scheme of the full CSI
of Bob being made available to Alice, and the effect of Eve’s
location information becoming untrustworthy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details our system model; Section III provides our analytical
solutions; Section IV provides numerical simulations; and
Section V draws concluding remarks. Secrecy performances
of the comparison schemes are provided in Appendices. We
adopt the following notations in this work. Scalar variables are
denoted by italic symbols. Vectors and matrices are denoted
by lower-case and upper-case boldface symbols, respectively.
Given a complex number z, |z| denotes the modulus of z.
Given a complex vector x, ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm,
xT denotes the transpose of x, x† denotes the conjugate
transpose of x, and Re(x) denotes the real part of x. The
L × L identity matrix is referred to as IL and E[·] denotes
expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our LBB scheme was examined for the simpler case of a
pure LOS channel in one of our previous works [16]. Here, we
expand on that simple scenario by considering more generic
and realistic channel conditions. That is, we will assume
KB > 0 and KE > 0, where KB and KE are the Rician K-
factors of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel,
respectively. The wiretap channel of interest is illustrated
in Fig. 1, where Alice and Eve are equipped with uniform
linear arrays (ULAs) with NA and NE antenna elements,2
respectively; and Bob is equipped with a single antenna. As
we will show later, our analysis provided in this work is also
valid for other antenna arrays beyond ULAs at Eve. We assume
that Alice, Bob, and Eve are static.
As shown in Fig. 1, we adopt the polar coordinate system,
where Alice’s location is selected as the origin, Bob’s location
is denoted as (dB, θB), and Alice’s location is denoted as
(dE , θE). For presentation convenience, without other state-
ments we assume that the coordinate system is set up such
that 0 ≤ θB ≤ π and 0 ≤ θE ≤ π. The orientation of the
ULA at Alice is also shown in this figure. We also assume that
the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are subject to
quasi-static Rician fading with equal block length but different
Rician K-factors, and that a K-factor map (K as a function
of locations) is known in the vicinity of Alice via some a
priori measurement campaigns. We further assume that the
2We will assume NE is also known to Alice. This is reasonable in
circumstances where Alice can determine physical constraints on the size of an
eavesdropper’s antenna, knowledge of which, coupled to the known frequency
of transmission, can allow for a reliable upper bound on NE to be set. If an
upper bound on NE is set, then our solutions become bounds (worst case
scenarios). In other circumstances, where Eve is at times a legitimate user,
we can assume NE is known.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the Rician wiretap channel of interest.
CSI of the main channel is unknown to Alice, but that Bob’s
location is known to Alice.3 Additional assumptions are that
Eve knows the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel and the
beamformer adopted by Alice; that Eve applies Maximum
Ratio Combining (MRC) in order to maximize the probability
of successful eavesdropping [8, 9]; and that Eve’s location is
known to Alice. As we discuss later, our analysis also covers
the case where Eve’s location is unavailable at Alice.
As per the aforementioned assumptions, the 1 × NA main
channel vector is given by
h =
√
KB
1 +KB
ho +
√
1
1 +KB
hr, (1)
where ho is the LOS component, and hr is the scattered
component. The entries of hr are independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and unit variance, i.e.,
hr ∼ CN (0, INA). Denoting ρA as the space between two
antenna elements of the ULA at Alice, ho is given by [17]
ho = [1, · · · , exp(j(NA − 1)τA cos θB)] , (2)
where τA = 2πf0ρA/c, f0 is the carrier frequency, and c is
the speed of propagation of the plane wave. The NE × NA
eavesdropper’s channel matrix is given by
G =
√
KE
1 +KE
Go +
√
1
1 +KE
Gr, (3)
where Go is the LOS component, and Gr is the scattered com-
ponent represented by a matrix with i.i.d circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit
3We note that using Bob’s location saves feedback overhead relative to use
of the CSI of the main channel. This is due to the following two facts: (i)
the CSI varies during different fading blocks and has to be fed back for each
fading block, meanwhile the location information only has to be fed back
once for a static Bob; and (ii) the CSI is an NA-dimension complex vector
(2NA variables embedded), meanwhile Bob’s location is determined by only
two real numbers.
3variance. Given the locations of Alice and Eve, Go can be
written as [18]
Go = r
T
o go (4)
where ro and go are the array responses at Eve and Alice,
respectively, which are given by
ro = [1, · · · , exp(−j(NE − 1)τE cosφE)] , (5)
go = [1, · · · , exp(j(NA − 1)τA cos θE)] . (6)
In (5), we have τE = 2πf0ρE/c, where ρE is the space
between two antenna elements of the ULA at Eve, and φE is
the direction of arrival from Eve to Alice which is dependent
on the orientation of the ULA at Eve. As we show later, the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the eavesdropper’s channel is
independent of φE when Eve utilizes MRC to combine the
received signals. As such, the secrecy performance of the LBB
scheme does not depend on φE and thus Alice does not have
to know φE .
The received signal at Bob is given by
y =
√
g(dB)hbx + nB, (7)
where g(dB) is the path loss component of the main channel
given by g(dB) = (c/4πf0d0)2 (d0/dB)ηB (d0 is a reference
distance and ηB is the path loss exponent4 of the main
channel), b is a normalized beamformer (i.e., ‖b‖ = 1), x is
the Gaussian distributed information bearing signal satisfying
E[|x|2] = P (P is the total transmit power of Alice5), and nB
is the additive white Gaussian noise of the main channel with
zero mean and variance σ2B . Likewise, the received signal at
Eve is given by
z =
√
g(dE)Gbx+ nE , (8)
where g(dE) is the path loss component of the eavesdropper’s
channel given by g(dE) = (c/4πf0d0)2 (d0/dE)ηE (ηE is the
path loss exponent of the eavesdropper’s channel), and nE is
the additive white Gaussian noise vector of the eavesdropper’s
channel with zero mean and variance matrix σ2EINE , i.e.,
nE ∼ CN (0, σ2EINE )
Then, the SNR of the main channel is given by
γB =
Pg(dB)|hb|2
σ2B
= γB|hb|2, (9)
where γB is defined as γB , Pg(dB)/σ2B . Assuming Eve
applies MRC to combine the received signals at different
antennas, the SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel is given by
γE =
Pg(dE)‖Gb‖2
σ2E
= γE‖Gb‖2, (10)
where γE is defined as γE , Pg(dE)/σ2E .
4The path loss exponent ηB is dependent on the Rician K-factor KB . For
example, ηB → 2 as KB → ∞. For simplicity, we assume ηB is known
to Alice since KB is known. This declaration also applies to the path loss
exponent of the eavesdropper’s channel ηE and the Rician K-factor KE .
5It is straightforward to prove that the secrecy outage probability is
a monotonically decreasing function of Alice’s transmit power for given
locations of Bob and Eve. As such, we assume that Alice always sets her
transmit power at the maximum value P .
III. LOCATION-BASED BEAMFORMING SCHEME
In this section, we first examine the secrecy performance
of our proposed LBB scheme in terms of the secrecy outage
probability and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity.
We then determine the optimal location-based beamformer of
the LBB scheme that minimizes the secrecy outage probability.
A. Preliminaries
In order to derive the secrecy performance metrics of our
scheme (e.g., the secrecy outage probability), we first derive
the probability density functions (pdfs) of γB and γE . Without
loss of generality, we derive such pdfs for a general b, which
is independent of hr and Gr. To this end, we first determine
the distribution type of |hb|. As per (1), we have
hb =
√
KB
1 +KB
hob︸ ︷︷ ︸
h˜o
+
√
1
1 +KB
hrb︸ ︷︷ ︸
h˜r
. (11)
Since b is independent of hr, h˜r is still a circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian random variable. Noting that h˜o is deter-
ministic, we conclude that |hb| follows a Rician distribution.
We next determine the parameters of this Rician distribution.
Following (11), we have
|h˜o|2 = KB
1 +KB
|hob|2 (12)
and
E[|h˜r|2] = 1
1 +KB
E[|hrb|2] = 1
1 +KB
. (13)
We note that |h˜o|2 is the power of the LOS (deterministic)
component and E[|h˜r|2] is the average power of the non-LOS
(random) component. As such, we conclude that |hb| follows
a Rician distribution with K˜B and γ˜B as the Rician K-factor
and total power, respectively, where K˜B and γ˜B are given by
K˜B ,
|h˜o|2
E[|h˜r|2]
= |hob|2KB, (14)
γ˜B , E[γB ]=γB
(
|h˜o|2 + E[|h˜r |2]
)
=
(
KB|hob|2 + 1
)
γB
1 +KB
.
(15)
The pdf of Rician random variables involves the zero-order
modified Bessel function of the first kind, which is not
suitable for further analysis (e.g., deriving the secrecy outage
probability). To make progress, it is convenient to interpret the
Rician fading as a special case of Nakagami fading. As such,
the pdf of γB is approximated as [20]
fγB(γ) =
(
m˜B
γ˜B
)m˜B γm˜B−1
Γ(m˜B)
exp
(−m˜Bγ
γ˜B
)
, (16)
where m˜B is the Nakagami fading parameter given by m˜B =
(K˜B+1)
2/(2K˜B+1) and Γ(µ) =
∫∞
0 e
−ttµ−1dt, Re(µ) > 0,
is the Gamma function.
Following (10), the SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel can
be rewritten as
γE =
NE∑
i=1
γE,i, (17)
4where γE,i = γE |gib|2, gi is the 1 × NA channel vector
between Eve’s i-th antenna and Alice, i.e., gi is the i-th row
of G. As per (3), we have
gi =
√
KE
1 +KE
ǫigo +
√
1
1 +KE
gr,i, (18)
where ǫi = e−j(i−1)τE cosφE and gr,i is the i-th row of Gr.
For any value of i (i = 1, 2, . . . , NE), we have
|ǫigob| = |gob|. (19)
As such, following a procedure similar to that used in obtain-
ing fγB (γ), the pdf of γE,i can be approximated as
fγE,i(γ) =
(
m˜E
γ˜E
)m˜E γm˜E−1
Γ(m˜E)
exp
(−m˜Eγ
γ˜E
)
, (20)
where m˜E is given by m˜E = (K˜E + 1)2/(2K˜E + 1), K˜E is
given by K˜E = |gob|2KE , and γ˜E is given by
γ˜E , E[γE ] =
(
KE |gob|2 + 1
)
γE
1 +KE
. (21)
Since the γE,i are independent, following (21) the pdf of γE
can be approximated as
fγE (γ) =
(
m˜E
γ˜E
)NEm˜E γNEm˜E−1
Γ(NEm˜E)
exp
(−m˜Eγ
γ˜E
)
. (22)
Following (19), we note that γE is independent of ro. This
indicates that the SNR at Eve is independent of φE when Eve
adopts MRC to combine received signals (we do not need to
know the orientation of the ULA at Eve for our analysis).
This also reveals that the SNR at Eve is independent of the
type of antenna array at Eve (e.g., other antenna arrays beyond
ULAs) since different antenna arrays only impact ro. As such,
our following analysis is also valid for other antenna arrays at
Eve (e.g., non-uniform linear arrays, circular arrays, rectangle
arrays).
B. Secrecy Performance of the LBB Scheme
In the wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is defined as
Cs =
{
CB − CE , γB > γE
0 , γB ≤ γE , (23)
where CB = log2 (1 + γB) is the capacity of the main channel
and CE = log2 (1 + γE) is the capacity of the eavesdropper’s
channel. Since CB and CE are unavailable at Alice, the perfect
secrecy cannot be guaranteed in the wiretap channel of interest.
For this reason we adopt the secrecy outage probability and
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as our secrecy
performance metrics. The secrecy outage probability is defined
as the probability of the secrecy capacity Cs being less than
the target secrecy rate Rs (bits/channel-use), which can be
formulated as [8, 9]6
O (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs)
=
∫ ∞
0
fγE (γE)
[∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
fγB (γB)dγB
]
dγE . (24)
6The secrecy outage probability is the most common metric used in physical
layer security when CSI on the channels is unavailable at Alice. However, it
is important to note this metric does not distinguish between reliability and
security [19].
With regard to the secrecy performance of the LBB scheme,
we first provide the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability of the LBB
scheme for a given Rs is
O(Rs) =
m˜m˜BB m˜
NEm˜E
E 2
m˜BRs
Γ(NEm˜E)γ˜
−NEm˜E
B γ˜
−m˜B
E
+∞∑
n=0
2nRs exp
(
−m˜B(2
Rs−1)
γ˜B
)
m˜−nB γ˜
n
BΓ(m˜B + n+ 1)
×
+∞∑
l=0
(
m˜B+n
l
) (
2Rs−1)l (γ˜B γ˜E)n−l ΓG(m˜B+NEm˜E+n−l)
2lRs
(
2Rsm˜B γ˜E + m˜E γ˜B
)m˜B+NEm˜E+n−l ,
(25)
where ΓG(·) is the generalized gamma function (also valid for
negative integers), which is given by [21]
ΓG(α)=
{
(−1)−α
(−α)!
(∑−α
i=1
1
i +α
)
, α is a negative integer,
Γ(α), otherwise.
(26)
Proof: Substituting (16) into (24), O(Rs) is derived as
O(Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
fγE (γE)
γ
(
m˜B,
2Rs (1+γE)−1
m˜−1
B
γ˜B
)
Γ(m˜B)
dγE , (27)
where γ (α, µ) =
∫ µ
0
e−ttα−1dt, Re{α} > 0, is the lower
incomplete gamma function. In order to obtain the result in
(27), we have utilized the following identity [22, Eq. (3.381.1)]∫ u
0
tν−1e−µtdt = µ−νγ(ν, µu). (28)
To make progress, we adopt the following identity to expand
γ (α, µ) [22, Eq. (8.354.1)]
γ (α, µ) =
+∞∑
n=0
Γ(α)µα+ne−µ
Γ(α+ n+ 1)
. (29)
As per (29), we have
γ
(
m˜B ,
2Rs(1 + γE)− 1
m˜−1B γ˜B
)
=
+∞∑
n=0
Γ(m˜B)
(
2Rs (1+γE)−1
m˜−1B γ˜B
)m˜B+n
exp
(
− 2Rs (1+γE)−1
m˜−1B γ˜B
)
Γ (m˜B + n+ 1)
=
+∞∑
n=0
Γ(m˜B)(2
RsγE)
m˜B+n
(
1 + 2
Rs−1
2RsγE
)m˜B+n
(
γ˜B
m˜B
)m˜B+n
exp
(
2Rs (1+γE)−1
m˜−1
B
γ˜B
)
Γ(m˜B + n+ 1)
=
+∞∑
n=0
Γ(m˜B) exp
(
− 2Rs(1+γE)−1
m˜−1
B
γ˜B
)
(2RsγE)
m˜B+n(
γ˜B
m˜B
)m˜B+n
Γ(m˜B + n+ 1)
×
+∞∑
l=0
(
m˜B + n
l
)(
2Rs − 1
2RsγE
)l
, (30)
5in which the identity [22, Eq. (1.110)]
(1 + µ)
α
=
+∞∑
l=0
(
α
l
)
µl (31)
is employed. Substituting (22) and (30) into (27), we have
O (Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
(
m˜E
γ˜E
)NEm˜E γNEm˜E−1E
Γ(NEm˜E)
exp
(−m˜EγE
γ˜E
)
×
+∞∑
n=0
exp
(
−2Rs(1+γE)−1
m˜−1B γ˜B
)
(2RsγE)
m˜B+n(
γ˜B
m˜B
)m˜B+n
Γ(m˜B + n+ 1)
×
+∞∑
l=0
(
m˜B + n
l
)(
2Rs − 1
2RsγE
)l
dγE
=
m˜m˜BB m˜
NEm˜E
E 2
m˜BRs
Γ(NEm˜E)γ˜
m˜B
B γ˜
NEm˜E
E
+∞∑
n=0
m˜nB2
nRs exp
(
−m˜B(2
Rs−1)
γ˜B
)
γ˜
n
BΓ(m˜B + n+ 1)
+∞∑
l=0
(
m˜B+n
l
) (
2Rs−1)l
2lRs
∫ ∞
0
γm˜B+NEm˜E+n−l−1E
exp
(
(2Rsm˜B γ˜E+m˜E γ˜B)γE
γ˜B γ˜E
)dγE .
(32)
We then obtain the desirable result in (25) by solving the
integral in (32) as per the following identity [22, Eq. (3.381.4)]∫ ∞
0
tν−1e−µtdt =
1
µν
ΓG(ν). (33)
We first note the secrecy outage probability derived in (25)
is a function of Bob and Eve’s locations and the beamformer b,
all of which are embedded in the parameters m˜B , m˜E , γ˜B , and
γ˜E . We also note that (25) is valid for arbitrary m˜B and m˜E
(m˜B and m˜E can be equal), and thus (25) is valid for arbitrary
KB and KE . As such, our derived expression for the secrecy
outage probability is of more generality than that presented in
[8], which is only valid for integral m˜B and m˜E . Although
the expression presented in (25) involves two infinite series,
they both can be approximated by finite series accurately. We
approximate the infinite series
∑+∞
n=0 and
∑+∞
l=0 by truncating
them at finite numbers. As we will show in Section IV, the
accuracy of such approximations is acceptable as long as the
truncating numbers are larger than approximately 100.
An important performance parameter associated with the
secrecy outage probability is the secrecy diversity order, which
determines the slope of the curve for the secrecy outage
probability (in dB) versus γB (in dB) as γB → ∞ for finite
γE . Mathematically, the secrecy diversity order is defined as
β = lim
γB→∞
log10O (Rs)
log10(1/γB)
. (34)
The secrecy diversity order of the LBB scheme is presented
in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The secrecy diversity order of the LBB
scheme is m˜B .
Following a procedure similar to that used in deriving
the secrecy diversity order of the antenna selection schemes
presented in [8, 9], we can obtain in a straightforward manner
the secrecy diversity order of the LBB scheme as m˜B . As
such, we omit the proof of the above corollary here. We note
that maximum value of m˜B is (NAKB + 1)2/(2NAKB + 1)
due to |hob|2 ≤ ‖ho‖2‖b‖2 = NA.
The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity is defined as
the probability that a positive secrecy capacity is achieved. As
per (23), it can be formulated as
Pnon = Pr(Cs > 0)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
fγE(γE)
(∫ γE
0
fγB (γB)dγB
)
dγE . (35)
Then, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity of the LBB
scheme is presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
of the LBB scheme is given by
Pnon = 1− m˜
m˜B
B m˜
NEm˜E
E
Γ(NEm˜E)γ˜
−m˜B
E γ˜
−NEm˜E
B
+∞∑
n=0
m˜nB γ˜
n
E
Γ(m˜B + n+ 1)
× Γ (m˜B +NEm˜E + n)(
m˜B γ˜E + m˜E γ˜B
)m˜B+NEm˜E+n . (36)
Proof: As per (35), the probability of non-zero secrecy
capacity can also be formulated as
Pnon = 1−O(Rs = 0). (37)
Substituting Rs = 0 into (25), we obtain the desirable result
in (36).
We note that the expression for the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity is simpler than that for the secrecy outage
probability and it only involves one infinite series. This infinite
series can also be approximated by truncating it at a finite
number. This approximation is very accurate even when the
truncating number is small (e.g., 10).
C. Optimal Location-based Beamformer
A location-based beamformer can be written as
b =
1√
NA
[1, · · · , exp(−j(NA − 1)τA cosψ)]T , (38)
where ψ (0 ≤ ψ ≤ π) is the beamforming direction. In this
work we define the optimal location-based beamformer, b∗,
as the one that minimizes the secrecy outage probability for a
given Rs. Therefore, defining
ψ∗ = argmin
0≤ψ≤pi
O(Rs), (39)
and setting ψ = ψ∗ in (38) completely define the optimal
beamformer b∗. We note that the value range of ψ is selected
based on the symmetric property of the ULA (e.g., ψ = π/3
and ψ = −π/3 lead to the same beamformer b). We note
that (39) is a one-dimensional optimization problem, which
can be solved through numerical search. Substituting b∗ into
(25), we achieve the minimum secrecy outage probability of
the LBB scheme, which is denoted as O∗(Rs). We would like
to highlight that ψ∗ can be analytically determined in some
special cases as detailed in the following corollaries.
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Fig. 2. F(Nx, νx) versus Nxνx/pi for different values of Nx.
Corollary 3: For KB > 0, the solution to (39) is ψ∗ = θB
in the following cases: (i) when γB → ∞ for finite γE , (ii)
when KE = 0, or (iii) when θE is unavailable at Alice.
Proof: In Case (i), as γB → ∞ the secrecy diversity
order determines the secrecy outage probability. As such,
as γB → ∞ the optimal location-based beamformer is to
maximize the secrecy diversity order given in Corollary 1 (i.e.,
m˜B) in order to minimize the secrecy outage probability. To
this end, ψ∗ is to maximize K˜B . Following (14), ψ∗ finally is
to maximize |hob|2. In Case (ii), there is no LOS component
in the eavesdropper’s channel due to KE = 0 and ψ does
not impact γE . As such, ψ∗ is to maximize γB in order to
minimize the secrecy outage probability. Following (9), ψ∗
finally is to maximize |hob|2 in this case. In Case (iii), Alice
is not sure how ψ impacts γE since θE is unknown. Then, ψ
is to maximize γB and thus to maximize |hob|2 based on (9).
As we can see from the above discussion, in all three cases
of the corollary the value of ψ∗ is the one that maximizes
|hob|2. So, to complete the proof we now prove that this value
is indeed θB . Denoting νA = τA(cos θB − cosψ), as per (2)
and (38), for νA 6= 0 we have
hob =
1√
NA
exp (jNtνA)− 1
exp (jνA)− 1
=
1√
NA
−ejNAνA/2 (−e−jNAνA/2 − ejNAνA/2)
−ejνA/2 (−e−jνA/2 − ejνA/2)
=
1√
NA
sin
(
1
2NAνA
)
sin
(
1
2νA
) ejνA(NA−1)/2. (40)
For νA = 0, we have hob =
√
NA. Then, following (40) we
have
|hob|2 = F(NA, νA), (41)
where F(·, ·) is defined as
F(Nx, νx) =

Nx, νx = 0,
1
Nx
(
sin( 12Nxνx)
sin( 12νx)
)2
, 0 ≤ νx < 2π. (42)
It is straightforward to prove that the maximum value of
F(Nx, νx) is Nx, which is achieved for νx = 0. This is also
confirmed by Fig. 2, where we plot F(Nx, νx) versus Nxνx/π
for different value of Nx. As such, |hob|2 is maximized when
νA = 0 and thus we have ψ∗ = θB (we ignore the negative
solutions due to 0 ≤ ψ ≤ π) in order to maximize |hob|2.
We note that for ψ∗ = θB we have b∗ = h†o/
√
NA
and |hob|2 = NA. As such, we have K˜B = NAKB and
γ˜B = (NAKB + 1)γB/(1 + KB). We denote the secrecy
outage probability of the LBB scheme with unknown Eve’s
location (i.e., ψ∗ = θB) as Ob(Rs).
Corollary 4: For KE > 0, the (multiple) solution to (39) is
ψ∗ = arccos
(
cos θE +
2nApi
NAτA
)
, nA = 1, . . . , NA − 1, in the
following cases: (i) when γE → ∞ for finite γB , (ii) when
KB = 0, or (iii) when θB is unavailable at Alice.
Proof: Following similar arguments to those used in the
proof of Corollary 3, we know that ψ∗ is to minimize |gob|2
for all three cases in Corollary 4. The value of |gob|2 is given
by
|gob|2 = F(NA, νE), (43)
where νE = τA(cos θE − cosψ). We note that the minimum
value of F(Nx, νx) is achieved when νx = 2nxπ for nx =
1, . . . , Nx − 1, which is also confirmed by Fig. 2. As such,
|gob|2 is minimized when νE = 2nAπ for nA = 1, . . . , NA−
1, and thus we obtain Corollary 4.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present numerical simulations to verify
our secrecy performance analysis of the LBB scheme, and
examine the impact of different system parameters (e.g., KB,
KE , γB , and γE) on the LBB scheme. To better illustrate the
gains obtained by our scheme, we will also present simulations
of the secrecy performance of the NB (non-beamforming)
scheme. This latter scheme represents the case when an
isotropic beamforming pattern is produced by Alice (see Ap-
pendix A for an analytical analysis of this scheme). To conduct
simulations, we deploy Bob and Eve at specific locations and
then map such locations into γB and γE , respectively. Such a
mapping is based on Alice’s transmit power (i.e., P ) and path
loss exponents of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel (i.e., ηB and ηE ). For presentation convenience, we
only specify the values of γB and γE adopted in our following
simulations. We note that in the following figures we use
“Theo” and “Simu” as the abbreviations of “Theoretic” and
“Simulated”, respectively.
In Fig. 3 we first verify our derived secrecy outage probabil-
ities for Nakagami fading channels. To this end, we generate
channel realizations as per the Nakagami fading channel,
where we have set m˜B = 2mB, m˜E = mE , γ˜B = 3γB ,
and γ˜E = γE , where mB = (KB + 1)2/(2KB + 1) and
mE = (KE + 1)
2/(2KE + 1). The theoretic secrecy outage
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probability of the LBB scheme,O(Rs), and the secrecy outage
probability of the NB scheme, denoted as ONB(Rs), are
obtained through (25) and (49), respectively, where relevant
infinite series are truncated at 100. In this figure, we observe
that the theoretic O(Rs) and ONB(Rs) precisely match the
simulated O(Rs) and ONB(Rs), respectively. This confirms
the correctness of our derived secrecy outage probabilities.
Recall that for mathematical convenience, our analysis
approximates a Rician channel with a Nakagami channel. To
see the effect of this, in Fig. 4 we again plot the secrecy
outage probabilities of the LBB scheme and the NB scheme,
but this time for specific Rician fading channels. In this figure,
we observe that the simulated minimum secrecy outage prob-
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Fig. 5. Minimum secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme versus
different values of θE , where NA = 2, NE = 2,KB = 10 dB,KE =
10 dB, γB = 10 dB, γE = 10 dB, and Rs = 1.
ability of the LBB scheme, O∗(Rs), and the secrecy outage
probability of the NB scheme, ONB(Rs), match extremely
well the theoretic O∗(Rs) and ONB(Rs), respectively, thus
confirming the validity of our channel approximation. We note
that we have set θE very close to θB in Fig. 4 (i.e., θB = π/3
and θE = π/4). The gap between O∗(Rs) and ONB(Rs) can
even be larger when θE is not so close to θB .
In Fig. 5, we plot the minimum secrecy outage probability of
the LBB scheme,O∗(Rs), versus different values of θE . Again
we observe that the theoretic O∗(Rs) matches extremely well
the simulated O∗(Rs), which again confirms the validity of
our analysis. Fig. 5 is also useful in that it more visually
represents how the minimum secrecy outage probability of
the LBB scheme depends on the locations of Bob and Eve.
For example, O∗(Rs) is maximized when θB = θE . In
the simulations to obtain Fig. 5, we also observe that the
optimal beamforming direction ψ∗ shifts away from θB as
θE approaches to θB .
In Fig. 6, we examine the secrecy outage probability of
the LBB scheme without knowing Eve’s location, Ob(Rs).
As per Corollary 3, we know that b∗ = h†/‖h‖ when Eve’s
location is unavailable at Alice. In Fig. 6 we also compare the
the solution with no information on Eve’s location to the NB
scheme. To conduct a fair comparison with the NB scheme,
we assume Eve’s location is uniformly distributed on a circle
centered at Alice, i.e., θE uniformly distributes between 0 and
2π, θE ∼ U [0, 2π]. We then averageOb(Rs) over θE to obtain
the average secrecy outage probability, denoted as Ob(Rs). As
expected, we observe that Ob(Rs) is lower than ONB(Rs),
which demonstrates that the LBB scheme still outperforms
the NB scheme on average, even when Eve’s location is
unavailable at Alice. This is due to the fact that the LBB
scheme improves the quality of the main channel based on
Bob’s location, which on average reduces the secrecy outage
probability. However, the most important result obtained from
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the simulations of Fig. 6 is that the secrecy outage probability
of the LBB scheme without Eve’s location increases (e.g., by
approximately a factor of 5 for γB = 10dB) relative to that
of the LBB scheme with Eve’s location. This quantifies the
value of the location information of Eve to the beamformer
solution.
It is worth mentioning how relaxations of some key as-
sumptions we have made impact the results presented here.
Of course, in reality it will never be the case that all reported
locations, all K map information, and all path loss exponents
are known with zero error. Errors in these quantities are
intermingled in the sense that an error in one leads to an error
in another. We have attempted to encompass such correlated
errors in a range of additional simulations. Our general result
is that a percentage error of 15% in any of these inputs leads to
an approximately 10% percentage error in our reported outage
probabilities. For anticipated error inputs, we can therefore say
that our analysis remains reasonably accurate.
Finally, although outside the spirit of our low-complexity
LBB scheme, it is perhaps worth discussing the gains to be
made when the full CSI information of the main channel
is made available to Alice (where the transmission scheme
is named as the full-CSI scheme). If Eve’s location is also
available at Alice in the full-CSI scheme, the full-CSI scheme
will of course outperform the LBB scheme for any values of
system parameters. For example, under the simulation settings
of Fig. 4, the secrecy outage probability of this full-CSI
scheme with Eve’s location is 15% lower than that of the
LBB scheme for γB = 10dB and γE = 5dB (determined
from simulations). If Eve’e location is unavailable at Alice (in
both schemes) then the full-CSI scheme outperforms the LBB
scheme by 40% for γB = 10dB and γE = 0dB under the same
simulation setting of Fig. 6 (determined from simulations and
analysis). For completeness, the secrecy performance analysis
of the full-CSI scheme is given in Appendix B.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and analyzed a novel beamforming scheme
in the wiretap channel where both the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel are subject to Rician fading. Our new
LBB scheme solely requires as inputs the location informa-
tion of Bob and Eve, and does not require the CSI of the
main channel or the eavesdropper’s channel. We derived the
secrecy outage probability of the LBB scheme in a closed-
form expression valid for arbitrary values of KB and KE . We
then determined the optimal location-based beamformer that
minimizes the secrecy outage probability. Comparisons with a
range of other schemes were then carried out so as to better
understand the performance gains offered by our location-
based solution. The work we presented will be important for
a range of application scenarios in which Rician channels are
expected to be dominant and where location information of
potential users and adversaries are known.
APPENDIX A
SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE NB SCHEME
In the NB scheme, Alice distributes her total transmit power
uniformly among the NA orthogonal independent transmit
directions (i.e., the covariance matrix of bx is P INA/NA)
[23, 24]. Then, the SNR at Bob is given by [23, 24]
γNBB =
γB||h||2
NA
. (44)
Interpreting Rician fading as a special case of Nakagami
fading, the pdf of γNBB can be approximated by
fγNBB (γ) =
mNAmBB γ
NAmB−1e
−
NAmBγ
γB
Γ(NAmB)(γB/NA)
NAmB
. (45)
We assume that Eve applies MRC to combine the received
signals at different antenna elements. As such, the SNR at
Eve is given by
γNBE =
γE ||s†0G||2
NA
=
γEλ
2
0
NA
, (46)
where s0 is the NE × 1 eigenvector for the largest eigenvalue
λ0 of G. The theoretical expression for the distribution of
λ20 has been derived in [25]. However, this expression is too
complicated to be used for further analysis. To make progress,
we adopt the simple approximation for the pdf of λ20 proposed
in [26]. As such, the pdf of γNBE can be approximated by
fγNBE (γ) =
(NAmE)
NANEmEγNANEmE−1
Γ(NANEmE)(γEλ0)
NANEmE
exp
(
−NAmEγ
γEλ0
)
,
(47)
where λ0 is the mean of the per-branch largest eigenvalue (i.e.,
λ0 = E[λ0]/NANE). The value of λ0 can be approximated
by [26]
λ0 =

KE
KE+1
+ 1KE+1
NA+NE
NANE+1
, KE ≥ 0.5,(
NA+NE
NANE+1
) 4−KE
6
, KE < 0.5.
(48)
We note that we have λ0 = 1 for arbitrary KE when NE = 1.
9Following a similar procedure to that used in deriving
O(Rs) in Theorem 1, the secrecy outage probability of the
NB scheme is derived as
ONB (Rs)=
∫ ∞
0
fγNB
E
(γE)
[∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
fγNB
B
(γB)dγB
]
dγE
=
mNAmBB m
NANEmE
E 2
NAmBRs
Γ(NANEmE)γ
−NANEmE
B (γEλ0)
−NAmB
×
+∞∑
n=0
mnB2
nRs exp
(
−NAmB(2
Rs−1)
γB
)
γnBΓ(NAmB + n+ 1)
×
+∞∑
l=0
(
NAmB+n
l
) (
2Rs−1)l
N−lA 2
lRs
×
(
γBγEλ0
)n−l
ΓG(NAmB +NANEmE + n− l)(
2RsmBγEλ0 +mEγB
)NAmB+NANEmE+n−l . (49)
As per (49), we can see that the secrecy outage probability
of the NB scheme is independent of θB and θE . However,
(49) is a function of γB and γE , which are dependent on
dB and dE , respectively. We note that the secrecy diversity
order of the NB scheme is NAmB , which is the full secrecy
diversity order. Also, following a similar procedure to that used
in deriving Pnon in Corollary 2, the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity of the NB scheme is derived as
PNBnon = 1−
mNAmBB m
NANEmE
E γ
NANEmE
B
Γ(NANEmE)(γEλ0)
−NAmB
×
+∞∑
n=0
mnB
(
γEλ0
)n
Γ(NAmB + n+ 1)
×
Γ (NAmB +NANEmE + n)(
mBγEλ0 +mEγB
)NAmB+NANEmE+n .
(50)
APPENDIX B
SECRECY PERFORMANCE OF THE FULL-CSI SCHEME
In the full-CSI scheme, Alice knows the CSI of the main
channel (Bob feeds back the CSI to Alice), but Alice does not
know the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel or Eve’s location.
Then, Alice adopts h†/‖h‖ as the beamformer b to maximize
the SNR of the main channel [24, 27] in order to minimize the
secrecy outage probability. The SNR at Bob of the full-CSI
scheme is given by [24, 27]
γCSIB = γB||h||2. (51)
Again using the Nakagami fading to approximate the Rician
fading, the pdf of γCSIB can be approximated by
fγCSI
B
(γ) =
mNAmBB γ
NAmB−1 exp
(
−mBγγB
)
Γ(NAmB)γ
NAmB
B
. (52)
We assume that Eve knows h by eavesdropping on the
feedback from Bob to Alice. We also assume that Eve knows
that Alice adopts h†/‖h‖ as the beamformer. Assuming that
Eve applies MRC to combine the received signals at different
antenna elements, the SNR at Eve is given by
γCSIE =
γE‖Gh†‖2
‖h‖2 = γE
NE∑
i=1
γCSIE,i , (53)
where γCSIE,i = |gih†|/‖h‖. In order to derive the pdf of γCSIE ,
we next first derive the pdf of γCSIE,i . As per (1) and (3), we
have
gih
†
‖h‖ =
1
‖h‖ (eoǫigo + ergr) (boho + brhr)
†
=
boeoǫigoh
†
o
‖h‖ +
breoǫigoh
†
r
‖h‖ +
ergrh
†
‖h‖ , (54)
where
bo =
√
KB
KB + 1
, br =
√
1
KB + 1
,
eo =
√
KE
KE + 1
, er =
√
1
KE + 1
.
To make progress, we make the following approximation
gih
†
‖h‖ ≈
boeoǫigoh
†
o√
NA︸ ︷︷ ︸
hCSIo
+
breoǫigoh
†
r√
NA
+
ergrh
†
√
NA︸ ︷︷ ︸
hCSIr
. (55)
We note that in (55) hCSIo is deterministic and hCSIr is a
circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variable. As
such, gih†/
√
NA follows a Rician distribution. Following
(55), we have
|hCSIo |2 =
b2oe
2
o|goh†o|2
NA
=
KBKE |goh†o|2
NA(1 +KB)(1 +KE)
,
and
E[|hCSIr |2] =
b2re
2
o
N
E[|goh†r|2] +
e2r
N
E[|grh†|2]
= b2re
2
o + e
2
r
=
KB +KE + 1
(KB + 1)(KE + 1)
.
Then, the Rician K-factor of gih†/
√
NA is given by
K¨E ,
|hCSIo |2
E[|hCSIr |2]
=
KBKE |goh†o|2
NA(KB +KE + 1)
. (56)
Following (55), we also have
γ¨E , E[γ
CSI
Ei ] = γE
(|hCSIo |2 + E[|hCSIr |2])
=
KBKE |goh†o|2+NA(KB+KE+1)
γ−1E NA(KB + 1)(KE + 1)
. (57)
Then, the pdf of γCSIEi can be approximated by
fγCSI
E,i
(γ) =
(
m¨E
γ¨E
)m¨E γm¨E−1
Γ(m¨E)
exp
(−m¨Eγ
γ¨E
)
, (58)
where m¨E = (K¨E+1)2/(2K¨E+1). Since γCSIE,i are indepen-
dent from each other, the pdf of γCSIE can be approximated
by
fγCSI
E
(γ) =
(
m¨E
γ¨E
)NEm¨E γNEm¨E−1
Γ(NEm¨E)
exp
(−m¨Eγ
γ¨E
)
.
(59)
10
Following a similar procedure to that used in deriving
O(Rs) in Theorem 1, the secrecy outage probability of the
full-CSI scheme is then derived as
OCSI(Rs)=
∫ ∞
0
fγCSI
E
(γE)
[∫ 2Rs (1+γE)−1
0
fγCSI
B
(γB)dγB
]
dγE
=
mNAmBB m¨
NEm¨E
E 2
NAmBRs
Γ(NEm¨E)γ
−NEm¨E
B γ¨
−NAmB
E
×
+∞∑
n=0
2nRs exp
(
−mB(2
Rs−1)
γB
)
m−nB γ¨
−n
E Γ(NAmB + n+ 1)
× (60)
+∞∑
l=0
(
NAmB+n
l
) (
2Rs−1)l ΓG(NAmB+NEm¨E+n−l)(
γB γ¨E
)l
2lRs
(
2RsmB γ¨E + m¨EγB
)NAmB+NEm¨E+n−l .
As per (60), we know that the secrecy outage probability of
the full-CSI scheme is dependent on the locations of both Bob
and Eve. This means that we require Bob and Eve’s locations
for the secrecy performance analysis of the full-CSI scheme.
The locations of both Bob and Eve are not only required by
the LBB scheme. We note that the secrecy diversity order the
full-CSI scheme is also NAmB (full diversity order). Again
following a similar procedure of deriving Pnon in Corollary 2,
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity of the full-CSI
scheme is derived as
PCSInon = 1−
mNAmBB m¨
NEm¨E
E
Γ(NEm¨E)γ¨
−NAmB
E γ
−NEm¨E
B
×
+∞∑
n=0
mnB γ¨
n
E
Γ(NAmB + n+ 1)
×
Γ (NAmB +NEm¨E + n)(
mB γ¨E + m¨EγB
)NAmB+NEm¨E+n .
(61)
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